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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ANATOMY OF AMERICAN CASTE

BRYAN K. FAIR*
Soon the United States will commemorate the quadricentennial of the first
permanent English settlement in America, the same place where twenty
Africans were sold as indentured servants in 1619.1 As with previous hallowed
occasions celebrating The Declaration of Independence,2 the United States
Constitution,3 and the Bill of Rights,4 Jamestown’s anniversary will
undoubtedly include metanarratives revering American equality.5 Indeed, one
need only recall the latest American presidential campaign to note the robust
faith with which some candidates appeal to equality of opportunity as a core
American value.
Notwithstanding such rhetoric, some Americans eschew invitations to
honor its meretricious traditions. Indeed, many aptly view claims of
constitutional equality speciously, noting the five century contradiction
* Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to all my colleagues for
continuing support. I also appreciate the support of the Law School Foundation, the Edward
Brett Randolph Fund, and all the many alums who have given so generously to the Law School.
Special thanks to Patty Lovelady Nelson, who makes magic with my ideas. And finally,
enormous thanks to Dean Ken Randall for his tireless efforts and unfailing support for the Law
School and to me personally.
1. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (7th ed. 1994):
The twenty Africans who were put ashore at Jamestown in 1619 by the captain of a Dutch
frigate were not slaves in a legal sense. And at the time Virginians seemed not to
appreciate the far-reaching significance of the introduction of Africans into the fledgling
colony. These newcomers, who happened to be black, were simply more indentured
servants. They were listed as servants in the census counts of 1623 and 1624, and as late
as 1651 some blacks whose period of service had expired were being assigned land in
much the same way that it was being assigned to whites who had completed their
indenture. During its first half-century of existence Virginia had many black indentured
servants, and the records reveal an increasing number of free blacks.
Id. at 56. See also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
3. U.S. CONST.
4. U.S. CONST. Bill of Rights amends. I-X (1791).
5. See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY (1995); STEPHAN & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE
NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997).
381

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

382

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:381

between the American creed and American practices.6 For them, America’s
Janus-faced laws and folkways have impeded its nationhood and diminished its
reasons for boast. For them, there is no American democracy, no American
liberty, and no American equality.
After the Civil War, the United States had an opportunity to begin anew,
and, to some, it appeared the end of slavery, the extension of citizenship and
the grant of voting rights to black men, and the assurance that state laws would
apply equally to black and white was such a beginning. Yet, as with earlier
constitutional compromises, too many other Americans remained unequally
protected, second-class citizens.7 The Negro’s hour for many was an elaborate
sellout: to white men who opposed the improved status of black men; to all
women who had labored alongside abolitionists but who now found
themselves omitted from the new constitutional protections; to other nonwhites
living in slavelike conditions across America; and to those black men who
believed America would be reconstructed to accept them.
At the center of the ongoing American constitutional abyss is the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee that historically has done more to
6. Perhaps no work presents this contradiction between American ideals and practice more
fully than GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1944).
7. Frederick Douglass clearly understood his outsider position when he stated in an 1852
Fourth of July oration:
What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, a day that reveals to him,
more than all other days of the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the
constant victim. To him your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty an unholy
license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and
heartless; your denunciations of tyrants, brass-fronted impudence; your shouts of liberty
and equality, hollow mockery; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings,
with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him mere bombast, fraud, deception,
impiety, and hypocrisy—a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of
savages.
Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July, cited in MASTERPIECES OF NEGRO
ELOQUENCE 46-48 (Alice Moore Dunbar ed., 1914). For contemporary treatments of the
thoughts of Douglass, see WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1984);
WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1991).
In a similar spirit, former Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, on the occasion of the
bicentennial of the Constitution, wrote about his reluctance in joining the celebrations:
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution
was forever “fixed” at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight,
and sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the
government they devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a
civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional
government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as
fundamental today.
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1, 2, 5 (1987).
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support discrimination and caste than it has yet done to eliminate either. “No
State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”8 The hollowness of that simple clause is evident from continuing
discrimination against so many Americans because of their race, gender,
sexual orientation, age, disability, poverty, and/or religion, to identify some of
the most intractable axes of American caste. Today, it seems beyond doubt
that Reconstruction did not go far towards ending American caste; equality
remains elusive for millions of persons forced into America’s subordinate
castes.
The purpose of this essay is to explain why modern equality theory in the
United States is empty9 and what must be done to restore its full, generative
power, the same interpretive vision that guided Earl Warren, William Brennan,
and Thurgood Marshall during the halcyon days of the United States Supreme
Court. In brief, equality jurisprudence is barren and ineffectual because its
potent, anticaste moorings have been deftly ignored and artfully dodged by
activist judges and commentators who wish to maintain the extant privileges
preserved for a few under the jurisprudential status quo.
In Part One, I reclaim The Declaration of Independence as a protest
document for this century, restyling it as The Declaration Against Caste.10 In
8. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (1868).
9. Cf. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1982)
(arguing that statements of equality logically and necessarily collapse into simpler statements of
rights so that the additional step of transforming simple statements of rights into statements of
equality not only involves unnecessary work but also engenders profound confusion); Kenneth
Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1983) (arguing that the equal
citizenship principle that is the core of the Fourteenth Amendment does have substantive content;
that is, to be treated by organized society as a respectable, responsible, and participating member
who belongs to our national community). Karst says the principle is violated when the organized
society treats someone as an inferior, as part of a dependent caste, or as a nonparticipant.
Professor Karst has expanded his discussion of equality in his recent book, KENNETH KARST
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989). See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 576
(1983) (arguing that the concept of equality is morally necessary because it compels us to care
about how people are treated in relation to one another, is analytically necessary because it
creates a presumption that people should be treated alike and puts the burden of proof on those
who wish to discriminate, and finally is rhetorically necessary because it is a powerful symbol
that helps to persuade people to safeguard rights that otherwise would go unprotected); Kent
Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 (1983)
(arguing that rather than banish the concept of equality from moral and legal argument it is more
promising to explicate a fuller understanding of the significance of existing concepts of equality).
Professor Westen has replied to some commentators’ critiques of his seminal article. See Peter
Westen, On ‘Confusing Ideas’: Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Peter Westen, The Meaning of
Equality in Law, Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983); Peter
Westen, To Lure the Tarantula From Its Hole: A Response, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1983).
10. Others have offered rewrites, including the famous Seneca Falls Declaration of
Sentiments. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S.
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Part Two, I illustrate that one could read the Fourteenth Amendment equality
principle through the same lens11 as some of its Nineteenth century proponents,
locating an unmistakable anticaste meaning, elegantly and eloquently
championed most notably by the complex, radical egalitarian, Senator Charles
Sumner, who challenged black caste unequivocally.12 In Part Three, I
deconstruct modern American caste, laying bare its familiar components of
stereotypes presented as policy sanctioned by the court. Next, I critique recent
opinions by disingenuous judges who too frequently read the equality
guarantee in its most restricted sense, a manner consistent with the views of
Fourteenth Amendment opponents.13 In Part Four, I remedy such analytic
missteps by re(caste)ing modern equality jurisprudence in three ways:
broadening the underinclusive goals of Reconstruction, re-centering the
anticaste meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, and framing a coherent
equality theory that applies consistently to different forms of caste. Then, I
illustrate applications of the anticaste equality theory to three recent decisions
where a court employing this theory would have reached different results. The
essay concludes with a simple enduring principle: since no person or group has
a constitutional right to maintain another person’s or group’s caste,
government action seeking to dismantle caste cannot run afoul of the
Constitution.
PART ONE
The Declaration Against Caste
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people,
for example, Americans with darker skin, to dissolve the caste which has
WOMEN (1991). See also LAURA A. OTTEN, WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1993). My
version broadens such earlier critiques by insisting that all morally irrelevant, socially constructed
castes violate the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the equality guarantee of the
Constitution.
11. Here, I am grateful for the significant work of Jonathan Stubbs who first discussed with
me the relevance of prisms and lenses. See Jonathan K. Stubbs, Perceptual Prisms and Racial
Realism: The Good News About a Bad Situation, 45 MERCER L. REV. 773 (1994). “The prism
model contends that because we have varying perceptions, we tend to see the world differently;
and therefore those differences are reflected not only in human decision making generally, but
also in judicial decision making.” Id. at 776.
12. See 30 MOORFIELD STOREY, CHARLES SUMNER (John T. Morse, Jr. ed., AMS Press
1972) (1900); DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1970). See also
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 225-35
(1988) (calling Sumner, Thaddeaus Stevens, and other advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment
radical egalitarians).
13. For example, some opponents argued to reject the Fourteenth Amendment because it did
not go far enough to assure the elimination of Black caste. Others opposed the amendment
fearing it would. For a summary of the views of opponents, see FONER, supra note 12, at 256-71.
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connected them to another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
equal station to which unbiased laws entitle them, a decent respect for the
opinions of others requires that they declare the causes which impel them to
demand substantive equal opportunity through anticaste legislation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all forms of prejudicial caste
are politicized, social constructions created as tools of domination; that all
humans deserve equality of opportunity and dignity; that they are endowed
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are equal opportunities at life,
liberty, education, employment, political participation, and the pursuit of
happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among
humans, deriving their just powers from the consent of the whole governed;
that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government.
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not
be changed for light or transient causes. But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations evinces a design to reduce some Americans under absolute
domination and caste, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
government, and to provide new safeguards for their future security.
The history of the United States of America is one of repeated abuses and
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny
favoring selected Americans. To prove this, let the facts be submitted to a
candid world.14
The United States was created to serve the political and economic interests
of a small sub-group of white men, relegating most other Americans to varying
levels of slavery or slave-like caste. That small sub-group established itself as
a despotic ruler over this country, reserving to itself all authority over the
means of accumulating wealth and power—land, commerce, politics,
education, and occupations. To ensure its domination, that small group created
a spoils system, seating itself and those most like it at the head of the
government privilege line. What emerged was a pernicious political,
14. See generally THOMAS R. BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES,
NATIVE RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 1492-1992 (1991); W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK
FOLK (1969); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER
DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO (1969); BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL
CASTE BABY: COLORBLINDNESS AND THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); DEE BROWN,
BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970);
FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 1; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.,
SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS (1996); HOFF, supra note 10; IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); IMMIGRANTS OUT! A NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTIIMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); DONALD G. NIEMAN,
PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE
PRESENT (1991); OTTEN, supra note 9; STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW
INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
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economic, and social caste system, with a few Protestant, white men directing
the extension of American caste and their own unfair privilege up to the
present. Consequently, most Americans, for most of its history, have
experienced what A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., would have described as shades
of freedom.15
That racial and religious elite called indigenous American Indians heathen
savages, declaring war against them, driving them from their sacred lands,
forcing them to submit to unnatural, squalid conditions on and off reservations,
and manipulating federal authority to betray treaties and drive Native Indians
to extinction. American Indian policy was a clarion call endorsing America as
a white man’s country and Manifest Destiny was a declaration of white
supremacy, legitimating the murder and pillage of any tribe that dared to stand
in the path of any white person.16 “The only good Indian was a dead Indian.”17
Those few Native Americans who have survived, live in America’s shadows,
significantly unseen, unheard, and uncounted.
That small white male elite made women, of whatever hue, domestic
slaves and sexual objects, denying them control over their lives, their property,
and their bodies through laws enacted most often without female
representation or consent. Government was men’s work. Business was men’s
work. Control of the family estate was men’s work. Men determined what
rights, if any, women would hold, segregating women in areas abandoned by
men, and devaluing women and their labor.18
By declaring that “the paramount destiny of a woman was to be wife and
mother,”19 that group placed some white women in a caste cage while claiming
to place them on a protective pedestal. Nonwhite women were relegated to a
subcaste beneath white women, receiving even fewer beneficial opportunities
within the women’s sphere. Male supremacy was presumed based on theories
of religious and biological determinism.20 Habit did the rest.
That elite forced gay men and lesbians to closet themselves, denying them
the most basic human right to choose a consensual life partner, delimiting their
rights and opportunities based on their partner’s gender.21 Current don’t ask,

15. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14. Higginbotham identifies the precepts of American
slavery law, including the enduring precept of black inferiority. Id. at 7-17, 195-206.
16. See BERGER, supra note 14, at 39-53, 66-84; BROWN, supra note 14, at 1-119; DELORIA,
supra note 14, at 28-77.
17. BROWN, supra note 14, at 149, 170-72. The statement is attributed to General Philip
Sheridan, though revised into an American aphorism.
18. HOFF, supra note 10; OTTEN, supra note 10; WILDMAN, supra note 14.
19. See HOFF, supra note 10, at 117-275; OTTEN, supra note 10, at 35-171; WILDMAN,
supra note 14, at 1-24, 139-60.
20. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986).
21. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996) (holding that class animus towards gays and lesbians is unconstitutional).
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don’t tell policies and other homophobic legislation continue the estrangement,
isolation, violence, and other discriminations against Americans who choose
same sex partners.22
That elite made African Americans, through slavery, segregation, and
other affirmative acts of subordination, a despised caste, asserting such persons
had no rights which a white person was bound to respect.23 A century later,
even as laws changed declaring an end to American apartheid, white resistance
to African American equality hardened, producing myriad devices and legal
interpretations that maintained the outsider status of black people.24 One still
hears trumpets for white power, for America’s legacy as a white man’s country
where blacks do not belong. Even more, one can see that whites rule
America.25
That elite made Mexicans and Asian Pacific Islanders its transient,
replacement laborers, admissible in and excludable from this country whenever
either policy served the interests of that group, whether building a railroad or
harvesting myriad crops.26 By closing off federal naturalization procedures to
whites only until 1870, and then to whites and persons of African ancestry
until the 1950s, Mexicans and Asians were not greeted by an immigrant
welcome mat, but rather by rejection or restriction.27

22. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 334-75 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993). See
also ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND LEGAL RIGHTS 495-566 (1997).
23. See BELL, supra note 14, at 26-50; DUBOIS, supra note 14, at 43-45; HIGGINBOTHAM,
supra note 1, at 3-16, 19-60; NIEMAN, supra note 14, at 3-29.
24. FRANKLIN, supra note 1, at 532-72; BELL, supra note 14, at 50 et seq.
25. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
(1992). See also CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS SINCE
WORLD WAR II 3-25 (John Higham ed., 1997). For an alternate critique, see THERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supra note 5.
26. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 14, at 324-32; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the United States: Invitation
and Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 190-204; Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on
Borders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 244-53; Richard Delgado, Citizenship, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 318-23; Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The
Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 13-43; Kevin R.
Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something
Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 165-89; Juan F. Perea, The Statue of Liberty: Notes
from Behind the Gilded Door, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 44-58; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Who May Give Birth to Citizens? Reproduction, Eugenics, and Immigration, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 205-19; Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist
Backlash, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 14, at 78-102; Patricia Zavella, The Tables Are
Turned: Immigration, Poverty, and Social Conflict in California Communities, in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 14, at 136-61. See also LÓPEZ, supra note 14, at 1-47.
27. See the Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103, and the Naturalization Act of 1870, 16
Stat. 254. For a comprehensive listing of immigration and naturalization statutes, see the current
website of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

388

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:381

That elite’s theory of racial supremacy also seduced many working class
whites, despite their desperate poverty, illiteracy, and restricted political
influence. For whites mired in economic caste, their whiteness and/or
maleness assured them a slightly higher life status than many others
constrained by multiple layers of exclusionary laws. Poor white men could
aspire to become like their elite brothers by shedding language, religion, or
other attributes that might serve as proxies for their exclusion. By becoming
white, they were assured fewer obstacles to their acceptance and belonging to
America, in ways that Americans with darker skin are presumed not to
belong.28
That small, despotic elite has sustained a tyranny of a minority, crushing
all opposition to its unfair privilege, by rendering its privileges invisible and
unassailable by its laws. Although expressed in terms of freedom and equality,
the new government’s organic laws extended voice to white male propertyholders or merchants, leaving most other Americans under their hand or heel.
Indeed, whiteness, maleness, and property became species of currency, with
persons possessing all three claiming as their birthright dominion over all
others.29
In every stage of these oppressions many persons have petitioned for
redress, but those petitions have gone significantly unheeded and have been
met with new injuries. A small elite, whose character is thus marked by every
act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
Unlike Jefferson, I reject theories of supremacy. No person has the right to
subjugate others and no government can maintain a person’s subjection.
Under American constitutional law, there is no caste.

28. Ken Karst has elegantly set out an equal citizenship principle, requiring that the society
treat all members as if they belong, politically and socially. See KARST, supra note 9. This
principle has been honored in the breach.
29. The leading authority on records of the Constitutional Convention is Max Farrand. MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 4 vols. (1937); a list of the
delegates attending the Convention is in vol. 3, app. B, 555. See also JAMES H. HUTSON,
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(1987); ARTHUR TAYLOR PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1968), especially
22-36, his lively, contemporaneous sketches of the delegates; JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966). For contemporary assessments of the
constitutional denial of equality, see BELL, supra note 14, at 26-51; FAIR, supra note 14, at 67113.
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PART TWO
The Anticaste Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment
When the Supreme Court, through Justice Samuel Miller, first interpreted
the Civil War Amendments, there was little ambiguity within the Court about
the pervading congressional purpose for the amendments:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of
them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to
this [equal protection] clause. The existence of laws in the States where the
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice
and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then by
the fifth section of the article of amendment Congress was authorized to
enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on
account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.30

Within a decade the Court would recognize its interpretive error, extending
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, at least technically, to all persons.31
Yet, before the Court announced its view of the amendments, numerous others
in Congress filled its journal, explaining their goals and motives for the
Fourteenth Amendment and related legislation. As the most articulate
champion for ending black caste in America, Sumner’s words are
indispensable to understanding what ardent proponents sought to accomplish
by the new equality guarantee. Sumner and others used the term caste
repeatedly when they explained the critical need for the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Religion and reason condemn Caste as impious and unchristian, making
republican institutions and equal laws impossible; but here is Caste not unlike
that which separates the Sudra from the Brahmin. . . .
In arraigning this attempt at separation as a Caste, I say nothing new. For
years I have denounced it as such, and here I followed good authorities, as well
as reason. Alexander Von Humboldt, speaking of the negroes in Mexico when
Slavery prevailed, called them a Caste. A recent political and juridical writer
of France uses the same term to denote not only the discrimination in India, but

30. Hearings on Civil Rights Bill, 43rd Cong. 358 (May 20, 21, 1874) (statement of Sen.
Morton). For the full text of the case, see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394,
410 (1872).
31. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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that in our own country, especially referring to the exclusion of colored
children from the common schools as among “the humiliating and brutal
distinctions” by which their Caste is characterized. (Charles Comte, Traité de
Legislation, Tome IV., pp. 129, 455.) The principle of separation on the
ground of hereditary inferiority is the distinctive essence of Caste; but this is
the outrage which lifts itself in our country, crying out, “I am better than thou,
because I am white. Get away!”32

Remarkably, if one examines modern American caselaw and commentary,
one finds scant use of the term caste in the American context. This is
especially surprising since proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment used the
term often. Consider Sumner’s use of one of the hundreds of letters he
received from blacks regarding school desegregation and the need for equality
legislation. He anticipated the devastating consequences of caste:
I call the especial attention of the Senator from Georgia to this declaration
from an humble colored person. The letter proceeds [written by a colored
person from Greencastle, Franklin County, Pennsylvania, Nov. 25, 1871]:
“Now, sir, allow me to ask you if the law has not the same power over a public
house or a public institution of learning that it has over a railroad company?
And if such be the case, allow me to ask you to bring the weight of your voice
and pen”—
Unhappily it is very little; I wish it were more—
“in favor of such a needed reform. In our public schools is the place to
commence to break down caste.”
“Caste!” I understand the Senator from Georgia to vindicate caste. He
proposes to maintain it at hotels and in cars. “Caste!” an unchristian,
32. Hearings on Amnesty Bill (Civil Rights Amendment), 42nd Cong. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). On the construction of whiteness, Sumner wrote:
Observe, if you please, how little the word “white” is authorized to play the great part it
performs, and how much of an intruder it is in all its appearances. In those two titledeeds, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, there are no words of color,
whether white, yellow, red, or black; but here is the fountain out of which all is derived.
The Declaration speaks of “all men” and not of “all white men;” and the Constitution
says, “We the people,” and not “We the white people.” Where, then, is the authority for
any such discrimination, whether by the nation or any component part? . . .
There is also the original common law, antedating and interpreting the Constitution,
which knew no distinction of color. One of the greatest judges that ever sat in
Westminster Hall, Lord Chief Justice Holt, declared in sententious judgment, worthy of
perpetual memory, “The common law takes no notice of negroes being different from
other men.” (Smith v. Gould, 2 Lord Raym. (1274)).
Id. at 385. For a comprehensive collection covering congressional debates on the Civil War
Amendments and related bills, see ALFRED AVINS ED., THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’
DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE
13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (Virginia Comm’n on Constitutional Gov’t 1967).
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irreligious discrimination, not to be vindicated by any logic, by any reason, and
least of all is it to have the foundation of law!33

Sumner understood the stigma of caste on colored persons, however, he
also noted the harm to the whole community. He knew the surest protection of
all children was common schools open to all:
What must be the feelings of a colored father or mother daily witnessing this
sacrifice to the demon of Caste?
This is an illustration merely, but it shows precisely how impossible it is for a
separate school to be the equivalent of the common school. And yet it only
touches the evil without exhibiting its proportions. The indignity offered to the
colored child is worse than any compulsory exposure, and here not only the
child suffers, but the race to which he belongs is blasted and the whole
community is hardened in wrong.34
It is not enough that all should be taught alike; they must all be taught together.
They are not only to receive equal quantities of knowledge, but all are to
receive it in the same way. But they cannot be taught alike unless all are
taught together; nor can they receive equal quantities of knowledge in the same
way, except at the common school.35

33. Hearings on Amnesty Bill (Civil Rights Amendment), 42nd Cong. 244 (Dec. 20, 1871)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). On interpreting the Constitution after the Civil War, Sumner
continued:
Before the war, when slavery prevailed, the rule was otherwise, naturally, but as I have
already said, the grandest victory of the war was the establishment of the new rule by
which the Declaration became supreme as interpreter of the Constitution. Take, therefore,
any phrase in the Constitution, take any power, and you are to bring it all in subordination
to those lofty primal truths. Every power is but the agent by which they are to be
maintained; and when you come to those several specific powers abolishing slavery,
defining citizenship, securing citizens in their privileges and immunities, guarding them
against any denial of the equal protection of the laws, and then again securing them in the
right to vote, every one of those safeguards must be interpreted so as best to maintain
equal rights. Such I assert to be constitutional law.
Sir, I cannot see it otherwise. I cannot see this mighty Magna Charta degraded to the
level of a casual letter or an item of history. Why, sir, it is the baptismal vow of this
Republic; it is the pledge which our fathers took upon their lips when they asked the
fellowship of mankind as a free and independent nation. It is loftier than the Constitution,
which is a convenience only, while this is a guide. . . .
Id. at 825.
34. Hearings on Amnesty Bill to Remove Political Disabilities Imposed on Former
Confederates by 14th Amendment (Civil Rights Amendment, 42nd Cong. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner).
35. Sumner continued:
The common school is important to all; but to the colored child it is a necessity. Excluded
from the common school, he finds himself too frequently without any substitute. Often
there is no school. But even where a separate school is planted it is inferior in character.
No matter what the temporary disposition, the separate school will not flourish as the
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Citing Rousseau, Sumner explained the need for instructive equality
legislation:
In the absence of the law people please too often by inhumanity, but with the
law teaching the lesson of duty, they will please by opposite conduct. Thus
will the law be an instrument of improvement, necessary in proportion to
existing prejudice. Because people still please by inhumanity, therefore must
there be a counteracting force. This precise exigency was foreseen by
Rousseau, remarkable as writer and thinker, in a work which startled the
world, when he said:
“It is precisely because the force of things tends always to destroy equality that
the force of legislation should always tend to maintain it.”—Contrat Social,
Liv. II, chap. 11.36

For Sumner all caste was odious. Thus, while he hammered away at racial
inequality and segregation, there is some evidence suggesting his support for a
broader application, similar to the one I champion herein:

common school. . . . White parents will take care not only that the common school is not
neglected, but that its teachers and means of instruction are the best possible, and the
colored child will have the benefit of this watchfulness. This decisive consideration
completes the irresistible argument for the common school as the equal parent of all
without distinction of color.
Id.
36. Hearings on Amnesty Bill (Civil Rights Amendment), 42nd Cong. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). Sumner implored his colleagues to listen to advocates for equality,
including colored citizens like J.F. Quarles:
Some ancient writer has said that the first part of equity is equality. Thus we may infer
that if there is inequality of rights, there can be no equity. If this be true what shall we say
of equality in the South? For, in whatever direction we go, whether it be in public places
of amusement, in the street cars, upon the railroad, in the hotel, or in the wayside inn, we
encounter the invidious distinction of caste and oligarchy. We cannot think of these
things without impatience; we cannot speak of them without denouncing them as
unworthy of an intelligent and humane people. Nay, we would be less than men if we did
not everywhere, and under all circumstances, utter our earnest and solemn protest against
this inhuman outrage upon our manhood.
Id. at 429. Likewise, consider Sumner’s use of [a letter from Professor John M. Langston, of
Howard University, to the WASHINGTON CHRONICLE, dated Dec. 26, 1871]:
Indeed, the colored man cannot be educated in any proper sense, however numerous may
be the school-houses to which he is invited, however bountiful the school endowment put
within his reach, however admirable the school system in accordance with the methods of
which it is proposed to educate him, if he is not made to feel in the common school, the
academy, the college, and the professional school, that his manhood, his civil and social
rights, are recognized and respected. This certainly is true of an American whether white
or black. To attempt the education of a person in the midst of a tolerated and justified
system of caste, is sure to dwarf rather than draw out and make useful his powers.
Id. at 433.
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Caste is the stronghold of that principle of pride which makes a man think of
himself more highly than he ought to think. Caste infuses itself into and forms
the very essence of pride itself.
In caste government is nurturing a tremendous evil, a noxious plant by the side
of which the graces cannot flourish; part and parcel of idolatry, a system
which, more than anything else the devil has yet invented, tends to destroy the
feelings of general benevolence. Such is caste—odious, impious, accursed,
wherever it shows itself.37

Sumner’s views were shared by others seeking to end black caste.
Consider, for example, the reflections of another Massachusetts senator:
In Massachusetts we had a struggle of ten years before we could destroy caste
in our common schools. It was only in the year 1855, by the Legislature that
sent me into this body, that the victory was won and the question settled, and
settled beyond all reversal. It was then decided that colored children should go
into all the public schools, and not be excluded from any.
. . . There may be practical difficulties in carrying out this system of equality; I
expect some difficulties; but, sir, it is the mode and manner of educating the
people against caste. In the contest of a year or two, perhaps of a few months,
the people will be educated to the high plane of republican and Christian
principle, so that they will look down on no class of their fellow-men because
of race or color.38

Another representative insisted that opening schools would help dismantle
caste:
But the fact that southern-born whites and blacks, in nearly equal proportion
and in large numbers, have, for the past six years, recited together and in
37. Hearings on Amnesty Bill (Civil Rights Amendment), 42nd Cong. 824 (Feb. 5, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). Sumner further explained:
The original bill contains both, and I now ask the Senate most solemnly to consider
whether, while decreeing equal rights for all in this land, they will say that those equal
rights shall not prevail in the common schools and in the jury box. Such, sir, I understand
to have been the vote of the Senate. What will ensure should it be confirmed by the other
House? The spirit of caste will receive new sanction in the education of children; justice
will find a new impediment in the jury-box. Sir, I plead for the colored race, who
unhappily have no representative on this floor.
I ask the Senate to set its face against that spirit of caste now prevailing in the common
schools, against that injustice which is now installed in the jury-box. I insist that the
Senate shall not lose this great opportunity. You recognize the commanding principle of
the bill. Why not, then, apply it throughout, so that hereafter there shall be no question;
for, sir, be well assured there is but one way of settling this great cause, and that is by
conceding these equal rights. . . .
Hearings on Civil Rights (Amnesty), 42nd Cong. 3738 (May 21, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Sumner).
38. Hearings on Public Schools in the District of Columbia; National Education Fund, 41st
Cong. 1061 (Feb. 8, 14, 1871) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
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perfect harmony, makes this institution [Berea College] typical of what may be
accomplished throughout the nation, and makes it of more than local
importance. It requires no argument to show how much the colored people
will be benefited by such an education. There is nothing like just such a school
as this to teach mutual respect and forbearance, to dignify labor, to enforce a
regard for the persona and property of all classes, and to take away some of the
arrogant superciliousness of caste and race.39

An unmistakeable urgency for full equality for black men was the goal of
ardent proponents:
Inasmuch as these four million colored people are made by the Constitution
citizens of the country, as they and their posterity through all time are to have a
lot and part with us as citizens, I say now, not waiting for an uncertain future,
but now when this subject is under consideration in the Senate of the United
States, and under consideration by circumstances which make us amenable to
posterity, let us do that thing which is right in the eye of the Constitution; and
nothing is right but absolute equality of rights.40

Even opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized its anticaste
moorings. Some opponents prophetically argued that the stains of the
master/slave relationship would extend black caste and that in response to new
legislation white intolerance towards blacks would expand:
It matters not how wealthy, how intelligent, or how morally meritorious the
negro may become, so long as he remains among us the recollection of the
former relation of master and slave will be perpetuated by the changeless color
of the Ethiop’s skin, and that color will alike be perpetuated by the degrading
tradition of his former bondage. Without this equality of political and social
privileges, and without the hope of a home and government of their own, the
emancipation of the slaves of the south will be but adding a new burden to
their wretchedness by compelling them to provide for themselves and families,
without setting before them scarcely a single incentive to exertion, or, if such
incentive should exist, it would only be in the desperate desire that by some
bloody revolution they might possibly conquer for themselves that equality
which their liberators had denied them. The result of such a revolution would
doubtless be their utter annihilation or re-enslavement. To appreciate and
understand this difficulty, it is only necessary for one to observe that, in
proportion as the legal barriers established by slavery have been removed by

39. Hearings on Civil Rights Bill, 43rd Cong. 1314 (Jan. 27, Feb. 7, 1874) (statement of
Rep. Ransier) (arguing in favor of non-proscriptive schools, reading from a notice for Berea
College appearing in THE AMERICAN MISSIONARY 243-44 (Nov. 1873)).
40. Hearings on Civil Rights Bill, 43rd Cong. 4168 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen.
Boutwell).
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emancipation, the prejudice of caste becomes stronger, and public opinion
more intolerant to the negro race.41

To the same effect, consider the remarks of a Missouri representative about
the universality of black caste, even in the free states:
There are no States in the Union which give to this class of people the rights of
citizens, and the man who insists upon emancipating slaves, and retaining them
in a country where every right except that of personal freedom is refused them,
that man, in my opinion, is not in favor of emancipation in its large and liberal
sense. It is “keeping the word of promise to the ear, and breaking it to the
hope.” It is simply the gift of personal freedom, unaccompanied by any other
rights which make freedom valuable. It is to retain them here as a degraded
caste, as they now are in all of the free States. They are not admitted, in any
free State, to a full equality with its citizens.42

Reconstruction was a chance for a new beginning. Black slavery was
abolished, citizenship became a birthright, race discrimination against former
slaves was proscribed, and black men were assured that any state that excluded
them from voting would suffer a diminution of its federal political
representation. The Radical Republicans intended to abolish black caste. Yet,
the Supreme Court did not share Congress’ enthusiasm for revision, and the
Court ruled that Congress lacked the power to enact most of the civil rights
legislation that it passed between 1865 to 1875. But rather than reduce the

41. Emancipation and Colonization: Hearings on H. R. 576, Report No. 148, 37th Cong. 16
(July 16, 1862) (statement of Rep. Albert S. White, Select Committee on Emancipation). White
continued:
. . . Experience, painful and sad, had convinced them that here they would forever remain
an inferior caste, denied every right which distinguishes or gives value to personal
freedom, while the conviction that the torrid zone, their natural organization fitting them
to endure its climate, where fervid heat enervates and emasculates all other races, gave the
best guarantee against the degradations with which they had been afflicted.
Id. at 28.
42. Hearings on Confiscation; Prohibition of Slavery; Colonization, 37th Cong. 173 (May
23, 26, June 2, 1862) (statement of Rep. Blair). But see at least one statement denying that
eliminating caste was the question to determine:
Let the colored people have their separate societies, let them have their separate schools,
let them have their churches. We are not now considering any question of caste, but of
race.
Let them have their social and other societies; let them have their faudangoes and their
places of public amusement; let them have their hotels; let them have their own graveyards; let them have their own churches; let them have their common schools. Why, sir,
in my State there is a normal school for the instruction of colored people, so that they may
be enabled to go among their own people, and educate them. We do not want colored
teachers to teach white children; nor do you gentlemen of the North; nor will the colored
people when they have their own competent teachers want white teachers to teach their
own children. Hearings on Civil Rights Bill, 43rd Cong. 368 (May 22, 1874) (statement
of Sen. Hamilton).
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scope of the new laws, Congress and the Court should have read them more
broadly, insisting that the laws prohibited all caste.
Reconstruction’s potential glory has been dashed significantly through its
singlemindedness. We needed more than the Negro’s hour. We needed to
recognize Sumner’s wisdom: all caste is odious and undermines equality
whether resting on race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, disability, or
poverty. Equality theory must remain empty until an anticaste theory finds
broad acceptance across these bases of caste.
A close examination of Reconstruction debates illuminates a potent,
anticaste aspect of the equality guarantee. Proponents sought to dismantle
black caste, while opponents resisted legal efforts to establish political or
social equality between whites and blacks. By recalling the use of caste during
Reconstruction, I seek only to re-center the anticaste moorings of the
Fourteenth Amendment proponents that have been lost in the pages of
congressional proceedings.
More recently, a few scholars have hinted at the appositeness of anticaste
analysis in the United States. For example, Gunnar Myrdal described an
American caste line in the middle of the Twentieth century, a line, defining
“the Negro group in contradistinction to all the non-colored minority groups in
America and all other lower class groups.”43 Caste best captures the structural
and experiential second-class status still forced on so many Americans because
of their race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, poverty, or religion,
among other bases of American caste.
Ken Karst addresses similar status issues through an equal citizenship
principle.44 Cass Sunstein has asserted an anticaste principle in the broad
context that I use this term, but he insists that legislators rather than judges
should apply the principle primarily.45 Likewise, Ruth Colker has set out a

43. MYRDAL, supra note 6, at 58.
44. KARST, supra note 9, at 3.
The principle of equal citizenship, as I use the term, means this: Each individual is
presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible,
and participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized society
to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant.
The principle thus centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely bound to the
sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community. . . .
Id.
45. Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1311 (1999):
There is good reason to think that the best understanding of the equality principle of the
United States Constitution has a great deal to do with a prohibition on second-class
citizenship, or “caste.” An anticaste principle can claim considerable support from the
theory and the practice of those who defend the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a principle
also fits well—far from perfectly, but well—with the general fabric and thrust of
constitutional doctrine. As a matter of political theory, the anticaste principle also has
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comparable anti-subordination principle.46
All three contemporary
commentators seem focused on the same phenomenon: the government’s
endorsement of policies declaring who belongs and who is an outsider. And
on that score, American governments have spoken often and decisively.47
In many ways, I agree with Sumner, Myrdal, Karst, Sunstein, and Colker.
Each implies that caste laws violate constitutional equality. Yet, none of them
goes far enough to set out the foundations for an anticaste equality theory that
is coherent across axes of caste.

considerable appeal, connected as it is with some of the defining ideals of liberal
democracy, which is designed to ensure that morally irrelevant characteristics are not
turned into a systematic basis for social disadvantage. The anticaste principle seems to
serve as a promising basis for both organizing and reformulating many aspects of the law
of equal protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2410 (1994):
Put too briefly, the anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from translating
highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage, unless
there is a very good reason for society to do so. . . .
Id. at 2411.
If opposition to caste is a basic goal, civil rights policy should concern itself first and
foremost with such problems as lack of opportunities for education, training, and
employment; inadequate housing, food, and health care; vulnerability to crime, both
public and private; incentives to participate in crime; disproportionate subjection to
environmental hazards; and teenage pregnancy and single-parent families. Policies of this
kind suggest a major shift in direction from the more narrowly focused antidiscrimination
policies of the past.
Id. at 2450.
46. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003, 1007 n.12, 1014-16 (1986):
In this Article, I argue that courts should analyze equal protection cases from an antisubordination perspective. Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate
for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in
society as a whole. This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men
and women, and between whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and
policies that directly redress those disparities. From an anti-subordination perspective,
both facially differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they
perpetuate racial or sexual hierarchy.
Id. at 1007-08. See also RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER
MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996).
47. For a counterview on the applicability of an anticaste principle, see Richard A. Epstein,
Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2456 (1994).
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PART THREE
Deconstructing Caste
If Americans are ever to realize equality of opportunity, they must
deconstruct and dismantle American caste. Consider female caste. Today,
women comprise nearly fifty-five percent of the voting age population in the
United States.48 Nonetheless, they constitute only a small percentage of the
nation’s legislators, judges, and chief executives. For example, fewer than 50
of the 435 members of Congress are women.49 Only seven percent of the
nation’s federal judges are women.50 The numbers on the state level are only
slightly higher. Twenty percent of all state legislators are women; yet, among
those persons elected to statewide offices, most states can boast no more than
two or three women.51 Only two of the nation’s fifty governors are women.52
The numbers for labor statistics and earnings are similarly bleak.
Why are women so disproportionately underrepresented among state and
federal policymakers? Is such gender caste traceable to centuries’ old past
discrimination which relegated women to the domestic sphere? Indeed, does
political caste explain why less than eight percent of all congressional
delegates are African American, less than four percent are Hispanics, and only
one percent are Asian Pacific Islanders?53 Why are no United States Senators
African American or Hispanic?54
Undoubtedly, one important cause of these disparities is voter conduct.
Despite their numeric majority, only sixty-seven percent of voting age women
reported that they were registered in the 1996 presidential election.55 Only
fifty-five percent of eligible voting females reported voting in that election.56
Similarly, only sixty-three percent of African Americans and thirty-five
percent of the Hispanics reported they registered in the 1996 election.57 And
fewer than fifty-one percent of the former and less than twenty-seven percent

48. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997,
Table No. 462 (117th ed. 1997).
49. Id. at 281 tbl.448. See also INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 823 (Borgna Brunner ed.,
1998).
50. ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE
NUMBERS 8 (1995).
51. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 48, at 285 tbl.457.
52. Id. at 283 tbl.453. See also Sunstein, supra note 45, at Appendices (setting out extensive
labor caste statistics).
53. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 48, at 281 tbl.448.
54. Id. at 288 tbl.462.
55. Id.
56. Id. Turnout in congressional elections is even lower, with as few as 45% of eligible
women voting.
57. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 48, at 288 tbl.462.
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of the latter reported voting.58 Such startling numbers confirm that voter
apathy knows neither race nor gender. However, the costs of nonparticipation
for these individuals are enormous, exacerbating the already uneven playing
field. In this context, nonparticipation extends the marginalized status of many
Americans, from generation to generation. Because many Americans once
could not and today do not count at the polls, they do not count. No one mired
in caste can afford going uncounted.
Yet despite partial complicity, another factor more fully explains the
numerous persons and groups that live in caste in the United States. The
principal cause of the huge disparities in the lives of men and women and in
the lives of whites and so many racial minorities is an American tradition
which has taught certain citizens that they are superior and thus more
deserving of civil and political rights and economic and social opportunities
than other inferior citizens.59 This historical discourse has taught, among other
realities, that politics is men’s work, primarily white men, North, South, East,
and West. To be sure, one of the greatest lessons of United States history is
that it has been a government of some white men, by some white men, and for
some white men. Nonwhiteness, nonmaleness, non-Christianness,
nonheterosexualness, among other caste classifications, have caused many
Americans to become strangers to its laws.
American caste is extant; it is hard to avoid. By every measure of wealth
or power women are subordinate to men, people of color are subordinate to
whites, homosexuals are subordinate to heterosexuals, the working poor are
subordinate to the rich, and so on. Although the imagery shifts slightly from
group to group, if one deconstructs caste, its anatomy is neither complex nor
normative. A common paradigm in the maintenance of status inequality in the
United States, a pattern which transcends the axis of caste, is the construction
of discourses which reify anachronistic, stereotypic images of individuals or
groups as outsiders, the implementation of policies which delimit the life
opportunities of those caricatured and vilified, and, finally, the approbation of
those exclusionary policies by courts.
Consider the essentialist caricatures of women as weak, blacks as lazy,
Indians as drunk, Hispanics as illegals, homosexuals as pedophiles, or the poor
as irresponsible. Each stereotype has led to exclusionary policies, relegating
millions of Americans to educational, economic, political, and social ghettoes,
unable to support or defend themselves or to escape their exploitation. And
courts have routinely averted their eyes, pretending not to see discrimination or

58. Id.
59. The answer lies in how women have been denied equal opportunity, including exclusion
from the legal profession, from voting, from employment, and from most of the best schools and
highest paying jobs.
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making it unassailable. To dismantle caste, one must make each layer visible,
deconstructing its roots and branches.
Consider the black image in the white mind and one can begin to
comprehend slavery, segregation, and modern racial separation.60 Blackness
was synonymous with indolent, child-like, unkempt, tainted, dirty, lascivious,
and brutish.61 One drop of black blood, one known black ancestor, caused
millions of persons to lose the white American’s presumption of citizenship—
of belonging—and all concomitant rights.62 White America denigrated
blackness, forcing all blacks, slave or free into an heritable caste.63
Declaring black inferiority was only the first stage. Next, whites enacted
numerous policies and laws that rested on their demeaning images of blacks.
In Louisiana, its laws as late as the 1960s were models for other parts of the
nation:
Louisiana requires that all circuses, shows, and tent exhibitions to which the
public is invited have one entrance for Whites and one for Negroes. No
dancing, social functions, entertainment, athletic training, games, sports,
contests ‘and other such activities involving personal and social contacts’ may
be open to both races. Any public entertainment or athletic contest must
provide separate seating arrangements and separate sanitary drinking water and
any other facilities for the two races. Marriage between the two races is
banned. Segregation by race is required in prisons. The blind must be
segregated.64

60. GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND (1971).
61. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO 1550-1812, at 8-32 (1968).
62. LÓPEZ, supra note 14.
63. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
64. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 179-81 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas continued:
Teachers in public schools are barred from advocating desegregation of the races in the
public school system. So are other state employees. Segregation on trains is required.
Common carriers of passengers must provide separate waiting rooms and reception room
facilities for the two races and separate toilets and separate facilities for drinking water as
well. Employers must provide separate sanitary facilities for the two races. Employers
must also provide eating places in separate rooms and separate eating and drinking
utensils for members of the two races. Persons of one race may not establish their
residence in a community of another race without approval of the majority of the other
race. Court dockets must reveal the race of the parties in divorce actions. All public
parks, recreation centers, playgrounds, community centers and ‘other such facilities at
which swimming, dancing, golfing, skating or other recreational activities are conducted’
must be segregated.
Id.
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The meaning of such laws was clear: blacks are unfit to associate with
whites. And, as Sumner stated so convincingly, that cry is the essence of white
supremacy.65
The final step was judicial enforcement of laws founded on racist
stereotypes. Plessy v. Ferguson66 was as important as any other case giving
Americans both the separate but equal doctrine and the colorblindness
doctrine, which ironically today mean the same thing. Critics of an anticaste
principle should recall in context the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan
who wrote that “[t]here is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”67 They should explain
why the Constitution, especially the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits governmental policies designed to eliminate caste.
Justice Harlan believed that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional because it
implied the inferiority of blacks and the supremacy of whites.68
Even before his important dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan wrote that
while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment was prohibitory, it also
contained:
[A] necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored race—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored—exemptions from legal discriminations, implying
inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing
them to the condition of a subject race.69

65. See SUMNER, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. For additional support of the view that Justice Harlan was concerned about racial
subordination, see his dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, 190 U.S. 3, 35 (1883). Justice Harlan
wrote:
But I hold that since slavery, as the Court has repeatedly declared, . . . was the moving or
principal cause of the adoption of [the Thirteenth Amendment], and since that institution
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom
necessarily involved immunity from and protection against, all discrimination against
them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other
races. Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that amendment, by
appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect that people against the deprivation,
because of their race, of any civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State, and
such legislation may be of a direct and primary character . . . .
69. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The quoted language provides an
interesting context for interpreting Justice Harlan’s assertion that our Constitution is color-blind.
Justice Harlan was concerned about racial subordination and laws which implied inferiority of
Blacks. Similar language is quoted in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
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Judicial Activism in Defense of Caste
By largely ignoring or discounting the stated goals of Fourteenth
Amendment supporters, the current Supreme Court has embraced a jaundiced
equality theory that fails to distinguish between legislative policies that
produce American caste and ones designed to eliminate it.70 Consequently, the
Court has announced a series of decisions in voting, education, and
employment cases that have produced results that are inimical to
Reconstruction goals, that is, to dismantling caste, especially black caste. The
retrenchment decisions from the Rehnquist Court over the past decade, cases
like City of Richmond v. Croson,71 Shaw v. Reno,72 Miller v. Johnson,73
Freeman v. Pitts,74 Missouri v. Jenkins,75 and their progeny, collectively
reverse many of the momentous civil rights gains achieved in the 1960s. Some
members of the current Court show such contempt for precedent, they write
opinions that reverse significant, hard-won civil rights, while barely citing
relevant historical context or precedent.76
In its winter, the Rehnquist Court has abandoned the initiatives started just
over thirty years ago, dismantling those legal victories of the 1960s and 1970s
in the same way that its predecessor gutted the Civil War Amendments and
federal civil rights statutes during the late Nineteenth century.77 Indeed, the
parallels to the post-Reconstruction Court portend the emasculation of the
1964 Civil Rights Act78 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.79
Using rhetoric of federalism, equal opportunity, and color-blindness, the
current Court majority has turned its interpretive power against citizens who
have only in the last generation begun to live on the margins of the “American
Dream.” This Court writes too often as if discrimination never happened in the
U.S. or that it occurred so long ago that nothing can or should be done about it.
70. Perhaps the clearest example is Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(a 5-to-4 decision on remedial affirmative action policies). For a full critique, see FAIR, supra
note 14, at 144-50.
71. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
72. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
73. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
74. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
75. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
76. Two significant recent examples of this sidestepping of precedent are found in the
Court’s opinions in Adarand which failed to reconcile the earlier decision in Fullilove, as well as
Shaw which was written as if the Court had not faced a similar claim in United Jewish
Organizations.
77. The parallels between 1872-1896 and 1973-1997 are remarkable. The current Court is
rereading modern civil rights statutes and reinterpreting constitutional provisions against the very
persons the revised laws were designed to protect, just as the post-Reconstruction Court did a
century ago in its repudiation of the Civil War Amendments and related federal civil rights laws.
78. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6.
79. 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973a to 1973p.
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Thus, Justice Thomas tells us government cannot make the races equal; it can
only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.80 Similarly,
when Justice Scalia writes that in this country there is only one race—
American,81 one must wonder if he inhabits the same country as most
Americans, a country that routinely has been decidedly antiblack, anti-Indian,
anti-Asian, anti-Mexican, but never anti-white.
For the current Court majority, the Constitution cannot do for equality
what it has done for inequality.82 Under such thinking, this Court has
abandoned the schoolchildren whom it promised to protect in Brown.83 The
same five justices have decided that in most situations it is illegal to create
majority-minority voting districts, where race is the predominant factor used to
create the district.84 A third area of retrenchment is in modern affirmative
action. There, Justice O’Connor has displayed a shocking insensitivity to racebased remedial policies, contending that there is no constitutional difference
between policies designed to eliminate racial caste and those which promote
white supremacy.85
Consider the Court’s education cases. The Court has all but abandoned its
mandate to desegregate schools or to promote educational diversity. Today the
Court has abandoned the meaning of Brown and Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education.86 Brown was a command to eliminate dual
educational systems, a superior one for whites and an inferior one for
minorities, entirely.87 It held that segregated schools placed black children in a
caste, stigmatizing them in ways likely to ever be undone.88 Such publicly
sponsored caste was inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection
Clause.89 Regrettably, the Court did not state directly the connection between
white supremacy and segregation, but Brown’s implicit meaning is
unmistakable: Brown meant that policies promoting racial supremacy were
unconstitutional.90
Swann was a belated order to recalcitrant school officials, who for almost
twenty years thumbed their noses at the Constitution, to adopt desegregation
80. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Indeed, this Court has an apparent mission to shift the balance of power between the
federal government and the States in favor of state authority despite longstanding precedent to the
contrary. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (redefining the scope of federal
commerce power, despite nearly 50 years of contrary precedent).
83. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98-101 (1995).
84. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-19 (1995).
85. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-37.
86. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
87. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
88. Id. at 494.
89. See id. at 493-95.
90. The Court would later make this point explicit in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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plans that would likely work immediately.91 Now, twenty-five years later,
America still has many color-coded schools and unequal educational
opportunity throughout the nation. Nonetheless, in Oklahoma City v. Dowell,92
Rehnquist set out a new test for ending district court supervision: whether the
school board had complied in good faith with the court order since it was
entered and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to
the extent practicable.93 Reminiscent of the “all deliberate speed” proviso in
Brown II,94 Dowell reveals that the Court will no longer force school officials
to prove much at all.
Moreover, in Freeman v. Pitts,95 the Court held that a district court is
permitted to withdraw judicial supervision with respect to discreet categories
in which a school district has achieved compliance with a court-ordered
desegregation plan. Justice Kennedy’s opinion clarified Dowell by listing
specific factors to examine before relinquishing supervision.96 These standards
are important because once federal authority is dismissed, plaintiffs must
initiate costly new lawsuits, rather than simply petition the court for a hearing.
They must also presumably meet the difficult burden of showing invidious,
purposeful discrimination.
Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins,97 the Court held that the remedial power of
the federal court does not extend to orders to fund salary increases or remedial
education programs, where student achievement levels remained below
national norms at many grade levels. Unlike Swann, Jenkins cabins federal
court remedial power narrowly, to eliminating the identifiable vestiges of the
de jure segregation, to the extent practicable. Thus, these new cases release
school districts from the evidentiary burdens established in Brown.
The Court’s mandate today is not desegregation, but restoring local
control, quickly. Therefore, no matter what schools look like, as long as no
one can prove resegregation is the result of invidious discriminatory intent,
local school officials can do whatever they want, leaving Brown as essentially
meaningless. And left in the Court’s retrenchment wake are the children
already disabled by historic undereducation and poverty. Much as Chief
Justice Taney’s legacy has been captured by his opinion in Dred Scott,98 Chief

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
Id.
Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
503 U.S. 467, 491-92 (1992).
Id.
515 U.S. at 98-101.
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 393.
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Justice Rehnquist’s will likely be the evisceration of Brown and the
resurrection of Plessy.99
This Court’s record in recent voting cases is no less retrogressive,
reflecting the same ahistoric, revisionism found in recent education cases.
Historically, the Court had identified two types of voting rights claims—
deprivation or dilution. Either a plaintiff was prevented from voting entirely—
through a device such as a grandfather clause, poll tax, literacy test, or white
primary—or districts were drawn to dilute the weight of a person’s vote—by
creating districts with unequal populations or employing single member or at
large districts to minimize black voting strength. For example, in Smith v.
Allright100 and Terry v. Adams,101 blacks could not vote in the primary, the
only election that mattered. The primary was opened to members of the
Jaybird Democratic Organization, which only whites could join.102 Also, in
Gomillion,103 all but a half dozen of the 400 black residents of Tuskegee were
gerrymandered out of the municipality and excluded from voting.
In other voting cases, minority plaintiffs challenged legislative districting,
alleging that districts were shaped and sized to minimize the impact of
minority voting. For example, in Reynolds v. Sims,104 the Court reminded us
that the right to vote can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen’s vote as effectively as by wholly prohibiting its free exercise. The
Court held the right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor can it be
destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box-stuffing.105
Reynolds guaranteed one person one vote.106 After the decision, the Alabama
Legislature could no longer apportion one Senate seat for 15,000 persons and
another for 600,000.107 Districts had to be roughly the same size numerically.
In Shaw v. Reno,108 the Court created a novel voting rights claim, requiring
no proof of invidious discriminatory injury. None of the plaintiffs in Shaw
claimed either an abridgement or a dilution of their voting rights. Instead, they
claimed that their rights had been violated essentially because they were placed

99. For students of history who recall Rehnquist’s statements during his confirmation
hearings regarding a controversial memo that he authored when he was a law clerk to Associate
Justice Robert Jackson, there is chilling irony that Brown has been undone on his watch. For a
concise, detailed assessment of Rehnquist’s controversial confirmation and the pro-segregation
memo, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 605-09 (1975).
100. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
101. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
102. Id. at 469.
103. 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
104. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 559.
107. Id.
108. 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993).
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in a majority-minority district—a majority black district.109 What was the
constitutional harm alleged in Shaw? That the new district was so strangelooking, so ill-shaped, that, on its face, it had no explanation save as an effort
to separate voters on the basis of race.110 Of course, when Hasidic Jews made
the same claim fifteen years earlier in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey,111 the Court told them they had not asserted an equal protection
claim.112
Shaw is another example of the Court’s deceptive comparison of cases out
of context. The only point that Gomillion and Shaw shared was a reference to
race in drawing a district line, a reference probably made every time a district
is drawn in the United States. The motives for using race and the
consequences following its use were completely different. Under Shaw, any
separation of voters by race is invidious, despite the motives or results.113 This
interpretation, of course, makes an inquiry into motives redundant and
unnecessary, implicitly rewriting the Court’s holdings in cases such as
Washington v. Davis114 and Arlington Heights v. MDHC115 where the Court
said that to prove discrimination, plaintiffs had to show evidence of purposeful,
invidious conduct by the government. Is it possible that the current Court
majority applies one standard for minority plaintiffs, but a different standard
for white complainants? It is difficult to reconcile Shaw and its progeny
otherwise.
Since Shaw, majority-minority districts in Florida, North Carolina,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas have all been invalidated under this modern
racial gerrymander theory.116 A Shaw-plaintiff presents an equal protection
claim if he establishes that race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters in or outside a
particular district.117 Obviously, in any case where a legislature intentionally
creates a majority-minority district, the Shaw/Miller standard will be met. So,
in my mind, majority-minority districts are presumptively unconstitutional for
at least five current justices. This result turns voting rights history against
minority groups seeking to elect the candidate of their choice. It makes it
much easier for white plaintiffs to challenge majority-minority districts. As

109. Id. at 637.
110. Id.
111. 430 U.S. 144, 162-68 (1977).
112. Id.
113. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
115. 429 U.S. 252 (1997).
116. The Court’s recent decisions since Shaw v. Reno have effectively taken the Court out of
its role of protecting minority voting rights. See, e.g., Hunt v. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
117. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
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bad, it opens the door to a direct constitutional challenge to the role of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in voting cases. The Court has told the DOJ it
cannot force states to maximize the number of majority-minority districts.118
The next step is a rereading of the Voting Rights Act itself, already suggested
by Justice Thomas.119
PART FOUR
Caste in the Twenty-First Century
Thus far, I have shown that current equality theory does not allow
government to eliminate caste. Antidiscrimination theory only allows
government to redress its own past discrimination; absent specific evidence
that the government was the bad actor, complainants cannot obtain relief from
federal courts. Stark statistical disparities in educational access, employment
opportunity, political representation, or elsewhere are insufficient to prove
invidious discrimination. As a result, widespread discrimination goes
unchecked and the law remains a shield for discriminators who act on their
prejudices against others.
Current equality theory views discrimination as isolated bad acts by a few
bad actors. Discrimination is aberrant not systemic; infrequent not universal.
Likewise, current equality doctrine extends various forms of privilege into the
future by confirming its invisibility and unassailability. These views turn caste
against its victims, pretending it has been remedied and treating all persons as
if there are similarly situated in caste.
Current antidiscrimination theory freezes American caste, ignoring its
causes and effects and extending it intergenerationally.
Historically
subordinated individuals largely remain dependent. In most situations, historic
societal discrimination is an insufficient basis to justify judicial intervention or
remediation. Absent particularized discrimination and ample evidence of
government misconduct, discrimination claims fail.120 The Supreme Court has
applied an ineffective theory and abdicated its duty to all Americans.
My critique has several parts. First, under our constitutional system, all
government branches have a duty to uphold the Constitution, including
ensuring that no person or group be relegated to second class citizenship.121
Thus, I would not confine anticaste efforts to legislation or legislators. Indeed,

118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 921-22.
See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 521-37.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

408

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:381

if caste is violative of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has a paramount
duty to interpret the Constitution to compel government to eliminate it.122
This is not another attempt at discovering the original intent of the drafters,
but rather a gentle reminder that some proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to eliminate black caste. But that goal is too narrow and
my chief criticism of Charles Sumner and others. Government not only has yet
a duty to dismantle black caste; it also must dismantle other forms of caste that
are the consequence of state-sanctioned discrimination. Black men will not be
free of caste until all women are. Women will not be free of caste until gay
men and lesbians are. Gays and lesbians will not be free of caste until Native
Americans, Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans are. Nonwhites will
not be free of caste until religious minorities are. Religious minorities will not
be free of caste until persons with disabilities are. Only affirmative anticaste
policies can eliminate the marked disparities in American life caused by
legalized prejudice.
Second, we should never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.
The Court has read the Equal Protection Clause in its narrowest sense. But
there is nothing that precludes the Court from reading the Clause broadly, as an
anticaste provision. I have shown earlier that Charles Sumner wanted nothing
less than to eradicate black caste. Such a meaning of the clause is majestic. It
gives the clause a meaning worth expounding and the only one that moves the
government towards establishing equal opportunity.
Third, since American caste has resulted from animus towards race,
gender, poverty, religion, sexual orientation, age, disability, among other
arbitrary classifications, the anticaste principle should apply to all such
classifications and their textured, complex intersections. The equality
guarantee should be coherent and determinate across axes of discrimination.
There is but one Equal Protection Clause; its prohibitions on government
should not shift with sliding scales of judicial scrutiny based on the Court’s
view that some discrimination is more pernicious than other forms. All
invidious discrimination should be unconstitutional absent a compelling
justification and proof that noninvidious means are unavailble to achieve the
governments compelling interest.123 Only after we construct a coherent
anticaste equality theory can we counter the analytical missteps contained in
recent cases like Podberesky v. Kirwan,124 Hopwood v. Texas,125 and Taxman
v. Piscataway.126

122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Id.
123. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
124. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 2001 (1995).
125. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
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In Podberesky, the court was asked to resolve the constitutionality of the
University of Maryland’s Banneker Program, a scholarship program
exclusively for African American students. Daniel Podberesky, a Hispanic
student who met the academic requirements for Banneker, challenged the
exclusive program as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. The court held that the Banneker Program could not
withstand the required strict scrutiny analysis applicable to all racial
classifications.127
The court’s analysis is quite dissatisfying. First, the court never articulates
Maryland’s invidious purpose for enacting the Banneker Program. Instead, the
court implies that any reference to race violates the Constitution. This
reasoning is the logical extension of cases like Shaw where the Court lowered
the proof standards for an equal protection claim, at least for white plaintiffs.
Second, the court’s opinion rests on anachronistic thinking. For example,
the court accepts the idea that racial classifications are more pernicious than
others on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. But
why? Animus against women, homosexuals, Jews, or persons with disabilities
is all pernicious. Why must the court declare a hierarchy among castes? I
should think that the court would apply one test against invidious
discrimination by government. The Court, through Justice O’Connor, has
required such a consistent rule for all race cases,128 but it needs to adopt one
rule for all invidious classifications.
Third, where there is no evidence of invidious motive, why would the
court second guess the legislative judgment? The Podberesky court insists that
strict scrutiny is essential because “absent searching judicial inquiry into the
justification for such race-based measures, there is no way of determining what
classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.”129
Curiously, Justice O’Connor’s identical formulation in Croson has polar
effects. On the one hand, it confirms that, at least in theory, some remedial
policies are animated by permissible aims. If that is what O’Connor really
meant, she has a significant challenge to explain why eliminating caste is
impermissible.
On the other, only those policies that result from theories of racial
inferiority or racial politics are unconstitutional. And given the court’s opinion
in Podberesky, it must have concluded the Banneker Program was the result of
racial politics. But that conclusions seems wrong factually because there is a
critical difference between Croson and Podberesky. In Croson, O’Connor
127. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153.
128. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
129. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153 (citing City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
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condemned the Richmond set-aside program as the result of racial politics
because it extended to so many minority groups, including some that had no
history in Virginia.130 But, the University of Maryland followed O’Connor’s
admonition, extending its remedial program to a group that undeniably has a
significant legacy of discrimination in Maryland and at the University, the
same place that told Thurgood Marshall, solely because of his race, he was
unfit to attend the Maryland Law School. Despite this care, Maryland’s
program was invalidated, leaving the University to guess what it might have
done differently. Soon the time will come for Justice O’Connor to explain
why she rejects an anticaste principle.
In Hopwood, the federal appellate court went even further than the court in
Podberesky. At issue was the use of racial preferences at the University of
Texas School of Law favoring African Americans and Mexican Americans in
admission to the prestigious law school in Austin, the same school that was
once so threatened by the admission of Heman Sweatt that the legislature
created a separate school just for him in lieu of desegregation.131 The court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the school from considering
race in admissions unless the law school can present a compelling justification
and prove that its policy is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest.132
More importantly, the court did not stop by applying strict scrutiny.
Instead, the court took the enormous step of rejecting the common
understanding of Bakke, deciding that it had been implicitly overruled by more
recent Supreme Court decisions.133 The court reversed Bakke by concluding
that achieving a diverse student body was not a compelling interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment.134
But, every first-year law student learns that lower federal courts cannot
overrule the Supreme Court. Only the Supreme Court can overrule Bakke and
until then all federal judges are duty bound to follow existing precedent. Thus,
not only did the Hopwood court apply the same flawed reasoning as the
Podberesky court, in its zeal to protect innocent whites, it usurped
constitutional power assigned only to the highest court.135

130. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
131. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
132. 78 F.3d 932, 934-35, 940.
133. Id. at 941-45.
134. Id. at 944.
135. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). “[I]f a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
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Finally, in Taxman, the court was asked to determine whether the
Piscataway Board of Education violated Title VII when it made race a factor in
selecting which of two equally qualified employees to lay off. The court held
that Title VII is violated when an employer makes an employment decision
based on an employee’s race. Applying the Supreme Court’s Weber test, the
court said that Title VII’s prohibition against race discrimination is not violated
by affirmative actions plans which have purposes that mirror those of Title VII
and by plans that do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminority
employees. The court struck down the Piscataway plan under both prongs of
Weber.136
Taxman is perhaps most notable because civil rights activists, fearing a
potentially devastating Supreme Court ruling agreeing with the antidiversity
theory of Hopwood, structured a settlement to buy off Sharon Taxman.137
Podberesky, Hopwood, and Taxman were decided under a misguided,
equality theory, one that fixes caste and extends privilege for America’s
longstanding affirmative action babies. No one really believes that Maryland
adopted the Banneker Program to subjugate Hispanics. Instead, Maryland was
trying to reduce educational caste among African Americans. And one cannot
resist the assumption that had Maryland included Hispanics and other minority
groups, the same court would have held the scholarship program invalid
because of racial politics. Strict scrutiny simply should not apply unless the
government acts invidiously to promote individual or group caste.
Under an anticaste equality theory, the court need only ascertain if the
relevant policy was enacted to advance individual or group caste. Did
Maryland adopt the Banneker Program because of animus towards Hispanics?
Did Texas adopt its admissions preferences to subordinate whites or Asians?
Did Piscataway lay off Taxman because of its impact on whites? Even if an
incidental effect of a government policy is discriminatory, that usually is
insufficient to prove invidious discrimination. At least that is what the Court
has told minority plaintiffs.138
In addition to permitting government to dismantle caste, another virtue of
an anticaste equality theory is the elimination of the arbitrariness and
unpredictability of three-tiered judicial scrutiny that obfuscates current equality
analyses. It is easily argued that when one looks for substance underlying
rational basis, intermediate, or strict scrutiny analysis, it is accurate to assert,
“there is no there there.” This anticaste theory presents a cabining principle for
all discrimination cases.
Finally, an anticaste interpretive theory promotes the essential purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause: similar treatment for similarly situated persons.
136. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550.
137. Id.
138. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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In this case, all persons mired in caste, for whatever morally irrelevant reason,
can be assisted up from caste. Lifting people from the bottom of the well in no
way thrusts others into caste nor invidiously discriminates against any person
or group.
CONCLUSION
One could divide American history into two distinct periods, a
prodiscrimination period (1492-1964), and an antidiscrimination period (1964present). During the first, millions of people were assigned second class status
because they were the inferior color, the inferior sex, the inferior religion, the
inferior class, or inferior in some other way. Now five centuries later,
American castes are hardened, appearing intractable and normative.
The second period has made illegal some of the discrimination. Yet, the
latest era has not had as its chief aim eliminating cumulative caste. Instead, the
antidiscrimination era compels government largely to close its eyes to the past
and the present effects of past discrimination.
Our next great historical period must permit government to ameliorate
American caste that has accumulated over centuries of discrimination and
despair. When government acts to dismantle caste, by aiding those mired in or
marginalized by caste, it cannot violate anyone’s constitutional interests. It is
only when government maintains a person’s caste that it runs afoul of the
Constitution’s equality guarantee.

